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Introduction 
 
Nordic Europe after the Brexit Vote 
The Five Nordic Countries Are Reassessing Their Relations with the EU 
Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz 
The UK’s EU referendum is making waves in the Nordic countries. The vote could give a 
boost to Euro-critical parties across the region. However, it seems unlikely that EU mem-
bers Denmark, Finland and Sweden will head for the exit in the foreseeable future or 
that non-members Norway and Iceland will loosen their ties with the EU to any signifi-
cant extent. Nonetheless, with the UK’s exit, the Nordic countries face the prospect of 
losing one of their key allies within the EU and will be compelled to rethink their posi-
tions in and towards the Union. There are already initial signs of adjustment – based 
on sometimes shared and sometimes divergent priorities. If the five countries are able 
to capitalise on their commonalities, Nordic cooperation in the context of an EU-27 
may well gain traction. 
 
The governments of the EU’s three Nordic 
members – Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
– reacted to the Brexit vote with profound 
regret, as did the governments of Norway 
and Iceland, both members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA). These five countries 
face the prospect of losing a powerful ally 
in future. They all have close political and 
economic links to the UK, based on com-
mon interests. They all count the United 
Kingdom among their five most important 
trading partners, and, with the exception of 
Finland, they – like the UK – are outside the 
euro area. They are also worried about the 
potential negative repercussions for their 
own economies post-Brexit and the pros-
pect of facing an even more dominant euro 
area. And for non-members Norway and 
Iceland, Brexit will make it much harder to 
influence the EU in line with their inter-
ests.  
By contrast, the Nordic parties on the 
far left and right of the political spectrum 
welcomed the British vote, seeing it as affir-
mation of their own longstanding – albeit 
variously motivated – antipathy to the EU. 
Left-wing movements such as the Swedish 
Left Party and the Danish Red-Green Alli-
ance regard the EU as an undemocratic 
system that prioritises the demands of a 
neoliberal economy over workers’ rights 
and the environment.  
Right-wing populist parties criticise the 
EU for what they see as the loss of national 
sovereignty, especially on migration issues. 
Timo Soini, leader of the Euro-sceptic Finns 
Party – and, as Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
also a member of the government – suggested 
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that there was clearly something amiss 
with the EU if a country as important as the 
UK was looking for the exit. In the wake of 
the referendum, the Sweden Democrats are 
calling for their country to leave the EU as 
well. By contrast, the Danish People’s Party 
is in favour of remaining in the EU – but is 
seeking to loosen Denmark’s ties with Brus-
sels, in addition to the current opt-outs that 
the country has negotiated in key areas of 
EU policy, namely Economic and Monetary 
Union (the euro) and the justice and home 
affairs pillar. Both parties, along with the 
Finns Party Youth, are demanding EU refer-
endums in their own countries. Timo Soini 
– who, as Foreign Minister and party leader, 
has to strike a balance between his role in 
government and the party line – is open to 
the possibility of a referendum after the 
Finnish parliamentary elections in 2019. 
However, the other ruling parties in Hel-
sinki dismiss calls for a plebiscite, as do the 
Danish and Swedish governments.  
Polls show that the majority of citizens 
in the Nordic countries are also opposed to 
EU referendums. In view of the political 
chaos unleashed by the Brexit vote in the 
UK, support for a similar referendum in 
Finland, for example, has sharply declined. 
In all three Nordic members of the EU, 
there is a clear majority in favour of re-
maining in the EU – some polls put the 
figures as high as 66% in Sweden and 69% 
in Denmark – especially in the wake of the 
British vote. Only 18% (Denmark) and 29% 
(Sweden) say that they would support Leave. 
By contrast, a large majority (71%) in Nor-
way opposes accession to the EU; there, the 
Brexit vote and the EU’s current internal 
problems have further diminished its 
appeal. The same applies to Iceland (56% 
against), which began accession negotia-
tions with the EU in 2011. However, the 
talks were broken off by the Icelandic gov-
ernment in 2014 due to a sharp downturn 
in support for EU membership following 
the country’s economic recovery. 
Nordic Positions in the Negotiations 
with the UK  
As regards the forthcoming exit negotia-
tions with London, the governments of the 
Nordic EU countries have remained remark-
ably matter-of-fact. Helsinki, Copenhagen 
and Stockholm immediately began to focus 
on defining and protecting their own inter-
ests. Just one day after the referendum, the 
Danish government set up an interministe-
rial taskforce to analyse the direct impacts 
of Brexit on Denmark. Finland and Sweden 
adopted similar preventive measures. The 
key issue in all these considerations are 
these countries’ close links between their 
own economies and the United Kingdom.  
With the economic implications at the 
forefront of their minds, the Nordic mem-
bers of the EU have therefore firmly posi-
tioned themselves against an overhasty 
break-up with London. Calls for the British 
to be punished by decoupling the UK from 
the EU to the greatest possible extent are 
firmly rejected. Instead, the Nordic coun-
tries are unanimously demanding the 
closest possible post-Brexit links between 
the UK and the EU. In Denmark and Sweden 
in particular, there are increasingly vocal 
calls for their own governments to play an 
active role in the talks with London with 
that aim in mind.  
The Nordic members of the EU are there-
fore likely to adopt a highly pragmatic posi-
tion in the exit negotiations. Limiting the 
damage to their trade relations with the UK 
will certainly be one of their priorities. In-
deed, in the view of some politicians, they 
might even be potential candidates for an 
informal mediating role, primarily because 
Denmark and Sweden in particular occupy 
a midway position between the UK and the 
rest of the member states in their policy 
towards the EU. Is such a role realistic? That 
will depend on how much room for ma-
noeuvre the two countries have on EU 
policy: both Sweden and Denmark have 
minority governments with limited scope 
that face increasingly influential Euroscep-
tic and anti-EU movements. 
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Impacts on Nordic-EU Relations 
Among the Nordic members of the EU, 
there is a general consensus that the Union 
should concentrate, for the time being, on 
essentials. Priorities should be the deepen-
ing of the internal market and the promo-
tion of free trade – which have long been 
the Nordic countries’ main interests in the 
EU. That includes effective implementation 
of decisions, less red tape and fewer rules. 
Another priority is to make the workings of 
the EU more transparent – another long-
standing issue on the Nordic agenda. 
In Denmark, there has lately been a 
hardening of attitudes towards the EU. A 
cross-party agreement adopted as recently 
as 2014 stated that Denmark’s interests lay 
in being “as close as possible to the core of 
the EU”. This aspiration was, in effect, 
abandoned after a referendum in December 
2015 rejected a conversion of the Danish 
full opt-out into a partial opt-in in justice 
and home affairs. The UK, a like-minded, 
Eurosceptic partner, and Germany, the 
Danes’ more powerful neighbour, have 
traditionally been the two lodestars in Den-
mark’s EU policy. But while London is head-
ing for the exit, Berlin is pursuing two 
major projects which are opposed by all the 
Danish parties: the strengthening of the 
euro area, and a common European asylum 
policy. With its current opt-outs in key 
pillars of EU policy and an increasingly 
Eurosceptic party landscape, Denmark 
thus appears to be drifting back to the EU 
periphery. Without a strong partner, the 
country is at risk of becoming more mar-
ginalised, especially in relation to the 
euro area. 
In Sweden, too, there is a concern that 
with the UK’s withdrawal, an important 
counterweight to the euro countries – and 
therefore influence over “core Europe” – will 
be lost. As a result, there are increasingly 
vocal calls in Swedish political circles for 
the country to become the leading force 
within the non-euro group. The UK’s 
threatened exit weighs heavily on Sweden 
when it comes to trade policy. In other 
areas, however, the absence of this tradi-
tional veto player might enable Stockholm 
to play a more active role in the EU. At the 
heart of Sweden’s EU policy is the vision of 
a social Europe built around fair and secure 
working conditions and more jobs for 
women and young people. Prime Minister 
Stefan Löfven has already announced plans 
to host an EU summit on these issues in 
Sweden in 2017. What’s more, Sweden – 
which, like Finland, is not a member of 
NATO – is also keen to intensify and deepen 
the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy. The recently published Global Strategy 
for the European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy was welcomed by both countries, 
which had been calling for this type of 
strategy for some time.  
Finland is calling for reforms in the EU 
and improvements in its functionality. 
While not regarding Treaty amendments as 
necessary at present, the Finnish govern-
ment does think it is important to work 
together to produce a clear and resolute 
vision for the future of the EU, with the 
survival of the commitment to European 
integration being Helsinki’s top priority in 
this context. Despite often resurgent criti-
cism of the EU and the euro, Finland is 
officially committed to its EU membership 
and makes this position clear. Nonetheless, 
the debate about a national exit referen-
dum, spearheaded by the Finns Party, is 
unlikely to die down any time soon. The 
dynamics of this debate will depend on 
developments within the EU and the exit 
negotiations with the UK.  
Norway and Iceland see their future 
within the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and wish to remain part of the Euro-
pean Economic Area (see SWP-Aktuell 
19/2013). Consequently, neither of the two 
countries’ governments considers that 
anything in their current relationship with 
the EU needs to change. For Oslo, the EEA 
Agreement has proved its worth; it is – and 
will remain – the key pillar of Norway’s 
relations with the EU. Norway has no desire 
to renegotiate the Agreement and is scep-
tical about EFTA membership for the UK, 
which would oust Norway from its current 
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position as the largest and most powerful 
country in this group. 
For both Iceland and Norway – small 
economies that depend on fishing and com-
modities – the EFTA and EEA have proved 
their worth as an appropriate framework 
for cooperation with each another and with 
the EU. Were the UK, with its heavy reliance 
on services, to join EFTA (an option which 
could be vetoed by either Iceland or Nor-
way), the nature of the organisation would 
radically change, possibly to the detriment 
of the current members. On the other hand, 
a weighty UK could help to recalibrate the 
relationship between the EFTA countries 
and the EU within the EEA framework, 
creating new opportunities for Norway and 
Iceland and boosting their influence. The 
two countries must now attempt to use 
their limited scope as EFTA countries out-
side the EU to influence the negotiations on 
the future UK-EU relationship to their own 
advantage – also vis-à-vis their Nordic EU 
partners.  
Prospects for Nordic-EU Cooperation 
The threatened Brexit poses major chal-
lenges for the Nordic region – but it also 
creates opportunities. The greatest chal-
lenge for the Nordic countries is to prevent 
any decoupling from the euro area coun-
tries (“core Europe”). At the same time, 
some politicians are hoping that Brexit will 
increase the Nordic influence in the EU. For 
that to happen, however, the Nordic coun-
tries would have to intensify and expand 
their cooperation within and outside the 
EU. So far, they have always been keen to 
avoid forming a distinct regional bloc in EU 
decision-making, largely because – despite 
the many overlaps – there are significant 
differences in their positions on a range of 
issues. Nevertheless, the governments of the 
Nordic countries believe it is important and 
feasible to further deepen Nordic coopera-
tion at the EU level. Indeed, efforts are now 
under way to improve and expand this 
cooperation, particularly in relation to the 
implementation of EU legislation, much of 
which is binding on EFTA/EEA countries 
Iceland and Norway as well. Through co-
ordinated implementation of EU directives, 
the aim is to avoid legal differences that 
would make it more difficult for their citi-
zens to live and work in the other Nordic 
countries, for example.  
Furthermore, Nordic cooperation could, 
indirectly, lead by example, showing how 
pragmatic collaboration can work for all 
the EU countries. The refugee crisis, for 
example, triggered unaccustomed tensions 
between some of the Nordic countries at 
first, but a new dynamic in favour of in-
tegrating the refugees has now emerged in 
their cooperation. A further beacon of 
cooperation of great practical benefit – in 
view of the ongoing digitalisation of Nordic 
societies – is the creation of a common digi-
tal market. In order to exert wider appeal 
beyond their own region, the Nordic coun-
tries should therefore continue to develop 
their particular model of integration in 
traditional and new areas alike. 
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